Hard-to-Find Bugs in a Post-Quantum Age
Matteo Steinbach, Peter B. Rønne, Johann Großschädl
Abstract
The transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) introduces a new class of 'Hard-to-Find Bugs' (HFBs) that differ fundamentally from classical cryptography. While classical bugs often involve carry propagation, PQC bugs are dominated by timing side-channels in polynomial arithmetic (e.g., NTT reductions in Kyber) and floating-point precision divergences (e.g., in Falcon signatures).
Key Technical Contributions
- Created a systematic taxonomy of PQC-specific vulnerabilities, analyzing Lattice-based (Kyber, Dilithium), Code-based (HQC), and Hash-based schemes
- Documented 15+ vulnerabilities in major open-source PQC implementations, including floating-point inconsistencies in Falcon that allow signature mutation
- Developed wycheproof-pqc, an extension of Google's Wycheproof framework that uses targeted Known Answer Tests (KATs) to detect these elusive bugs